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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
000O000-
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs, 
ROY BENJAMIN HOSKINS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20010589-CA 
000O000 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the evidence in this case, reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff, prove a violation of the ordinance 
under which it was brought? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Plaintiff's argument at 
trial and, as a question of statutory construction, is reviewed for 
correctness, giving no particular deference to the Trial Court's 
decision. See Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 
(Utah 1989) . Insofar as the issue depends on the sufficiency of the 
evidence to meet the requirements of the ordinance, Defendant must 
marshal the evidence in favor of the Plaintiff and show that it is 
not sufficient. See In re Beasley, 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994). 
2. Did the Trial Court commit a clear error when it held that 
Defendant stated "the police were telling me or someone to stop" 
when Defendant testified at trial, and thereby concluded that 
Defendant had heard or seen the police officers trying to get him 
to stop? 
This is a finding of fact and "the trial court's underlying 
factual findings will not be set aside unless they are found to be 
clearly erroneous." See State v. Thurman,846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 
1993) . Insofar as the issue depends on the sufficiency of the 
evidence to meet the requirements of the ordinance, Defendant must 
marshal the evidence in favor of the Plaintiff and show that it is 
not sufficient. See In re Beasley, 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE 
West Valley City Criminal Code: 
21-6-107 Fleeing a Peace Officer. 
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It is a class "B" misdemeanor for any person on foot on or in 
a non-motorized vehicle to knowingly flee from, evade, escape 
or attempt to flee from, escape or evade a peace officer after 
being lawfully detained, arrested or stopped, or after 
receiving a reasonable visual or audible signal or command to 
remain or stop. 
41-6-13 (1) Obedience to Peace Officer or Other Traffic Controllers 
- Speeding in Construction Zones 
A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any 
lawful order or direction of any peace officer, fireman, 
flagger at a highway construction or maintenance site, or 
uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law with 
authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
41-6-13.5 (1) (a) Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop -
Fleeing - Causing Property Damage or Bodily Injury - Suspension of 
Driver's License - Forfeiture of Vehicle - Penalties. 
An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a 
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop may not operate 
his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as 
to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or 
person and may not attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
This is an appeal from a judgment and order of conviction in 
which Defendant was convicted in the Third District Court, West 
Valley Department, of the crime of evading a police officer 
pursuant to § 21-6-107 of the West Valley City Municipal Code. The 
matter was tried, without a jury (R. 49), on July 9, 2 001 and the 
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judgment of conviction was entered on July 10, 2001. The notice of 
appeal was filed July 16, 2001 (R. 52) . 
Statement of Facts 
A West Valley City ordinance makes it a class "B" misdemeanor 
for any person on foot or in a non-motorized vehicle to knowingly 
flee from, evade, escape or attempt to flee, escape or evade a 
peace officer . . . after receiving a reasonable visual or audible 
signal or command to remain or stop." (West Valley City Criminal 
Code 21-6-107) 
On or about March 22, 2 001, at approximately 7:30 p.m., 
Defendant was driving home from work. As he drove by the park 
across the street from his house, he saw some neighborhood kids who 
were responsible for painting graffiti on his new fence. 
Immediately after parking his car in his driveway, the Defendant 
walked across the street and confronted the kids about the 
graffiti. While he was talking to the kids, two West Valley police 
officers, having been dispatched to the neighborhood to investigate 
a reported disturbance, pulled up in their patrol car and parked 
some distance away from the group to watch. Responding to questions 
about the nature of the call and the description of the suspect, 
4 
Officer Casias testified that he and his partner "were given that 
the suspect was--was a male black with a shaved head, a blue 
Hawaiian shirt and he at--at the time, was confronting some males 
at the basketball court at that location." (Tr. 6) . Officer Robert 
Casias said he and his partner, after seeing the Defendant "talking 
to a group of people next to the curb by the roadside," did nothing 
to announce their presence to the group (Tr. 6). Officer Casias 
testified that, "We did not turn our lights or anything on, but we 
pulled over to the curb and kinda observed." (Tr. 6). 
From here, the facts remain in dispute (see Point II below). 
Officer Casias testified that as the Defendant finished talking 
with the kids and began walking away from the park he and his 
partner got out of the car to "make contact with him and at that 
time is when we started telling him to stop." (Tr. 11). 
Officer Casias testified that he yelled for the Defendant to 
stop "three or four times," (Tr. 7) the first of which caused the 
Defendant to begin hopping and jumping and prancing across the 
street. Under cross examination, Officer Casias explained how he 
remembered the Defendant acknowledged the command to stop: 
Q So, he--he crossed the street at some point and walked up 
to his house and went in? 
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A Yeah. 
Q Or you say danced? 
A He put his hands up in the air and was hopping up and 
down where which-
Q Hopping up and down? 
A He was jumping up and down as he went across, like he was 
prancing across the road. (Tr. 10, 11) 
When asked under cross-examination if he was clear that the 
Defendant saw or heard the officers, Officer Casias said, "There's 
no question in our mind, he--he saw us, turned his back towards us 
..." (Tr. 11). 
The Defendant, however, testified that after he began walking 
away from the park and until he walked into his house, he did not 
hear anyone yelling for him to stop (Tr. 15), and that he did not 
hop, jump or prance across the street (Tr. 15) . This testimony is 
supported by that of two other trial court witnesses: Andrew 
Kaufana, a neighbor, and Jodi Mattinson, Defendant's girlfriend. 
When asked if he heard the police officers yell at the 
Defendant, Mr. Kaufana testified he did not: 
Q Now, you heard this officer testify he yelled loudly 
three or four times to stop; you didn't hear any such 
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thing? 
A No. I didn't. (Tr. 21) 
When asked if he saw the Defendant "hopping or dancing," Mr. 
Kaufana said, uno" (Tr. 22). Ms. Mattinson's testimony also backs 
this up as she testified that she did not hear the police officers 
yelling for anyone to stop (Tr. 26) , and that she saw the Defendant 
walk normally into his house (Tr. 27). 
At this point, Defendant walked into his house. Defendant 
testified that he walked into his house and put the dogs into the 
backyard. Hearing a commotion in his front yard, he walked around 
the side of his house and toward the front yard. At that point, he 
was directly confronted by a number of police officers with their 
weapons drawn. Defendant's testimony makes in clear that his 
concern was getting his dogs into his backyard, not eluding the 
police: 
Q What did you do when you got in your house? 
A I put my dogs out. I keep my dogs in the house when I'm 
away and I put the dogs out in the back yard when I'm at 
home. 
Q And so you went out into the back yard with your dogs? 
A Yes, sir. To put the dogs out. 
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Q And what did you see or hear then? 
A At the time, my girlfriend's still yelling, I come to the 
front, when I come to the front, the officers, seven or 
eight of them, had their AR-14s pointed, told me to get 
on the ground." (Tr. 16) 
When the Defendant was asked how long it took him to get into 
his house, take the dogs out and get into the back yard, he 
testified that it took, "Fifteen seconds, 20 seconds, max." (Tr. 
17) . When asked if he knew uwhat the fuss was about" before being 
confronted and arrested by the police officers in his front yard, 
Defendant testified that he did not (Tr. 17). 
For his part, Officer Casias testified that the Defendant 
walked into his front door and soon re-appeared around the side of 
the house, walking toward the police officers in the front yard, 
where he was handcuffed and arrested. 
Defendant was charged with fleeing a police officer. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Trial Court's conclusion, the Defendant's behavior did not rise to 
that required by West valley City's ordinance prohibiting "fleeing 
a peace officer." 
II. The Trial Court was clearly erroneous when it found that 
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Defendant stated "the police were telling me or someone to stop," 
and thereby concluded that defendant had heard or seen police 
officers' attempts to have Defendant stop. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S BEHAVIOR DID NOT RISE TO THAT REQUIRED BY WEST VALLEY 
CITY'S ORDINANCE PROHIBITING FLEEING OR EVADING A POLICE OFFICER. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Trial 
Court's determination, the Defendant heard police officers yell at 
him to stop, made some kind of acknowledgment, and then hopped, 
jumped or pranced across the street and walked into his house. He 
then took only a few minutes to let his dogs out into the backyard 
and then returned to the front of his house where he was directly 
confronted and arrested by the officers. 
When asked what he said when he first approached the 
Defendant, Officer Casias said, uWe told him to stop. He seen (sic) 
us, he did-he turned around, I don't know what he was doing, he was 
facing east, with his back towards us." (Tr. 7). 
Q Did he acknowledge you, turn around, say anything? 
A He did something when he turned his back towards us and 
then he put his hands up in the air and started to dance 
around and he headed north across the street, going to 
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the house right on the northeast corner. (Tr. 7) 
Under cross-examination, Officer Casias said the Defendant was 
"hopping up and down," and he was ujumping up and down as he went 
across, like he was prancing across the road." (Tr. 10, 11). 
Q Did he ever come back out of the home? 
A While I was talking to (Defendant's girlfriend) other 
officers were arriving and the next thing I know, he was 
in the backyard area. 
Q Okay. Was he apprehended in the backyard? 
A Apparently not. He was told to come out, he did ... 
(Tr. 9) 
Even assuming that Defendant heard the police officers yelling 
for him to stop, his subsequent behavior, even taken in the light 
most favorable to the Trial Court's determination, hardly rises to 
the level required by the common meaning of the terms "flee," 
*escape" or *evade." 
In questions of statutory construction, Utah law requires that 
courts must follow the plain meaning of unambiguous language. 
"When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean 
what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." See Salt 
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Lake Child & Family Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 
(Utah 1995); and "a statute's unambiguous language 'may not be 
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." See Zoll & Branch, 
P.C. v. Asav, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). Finally, in those 
instances when a term might have a number of possible meanings, 
this Court has held that "a statutory term should be interpreted 
and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the 
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is 
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute." See 
Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P. 2d 1045 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines the most common usage 
of "evade" as: "To escape or avoid by cleverness or deceit." Not 
only is this definition given priority of place in the dictionary, 
but it is the most consistent usage of the word within the context 
of the ordinance. The other two terms used by the West Valley 
ordinance support this definition for "evade." The terms "escape" 
and "flee" imply even more strongly the idea of running or trying 
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to get away from something, or to removing yourself from a set of 
circumstances. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "escape" as 
"break[ing] loose from confinement"; and "flee" as "run[ning] 
away." 
The ordinance at issue here is a West Valley city ordinance. 
It is certainly analogous to the Utah statue on evading or eluding 
a police officer, § 41-13.5 U.C.A. set forth above. This statute 
applies to motor vehicles, but also prohibits "attempt [ing] to flee 
or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means. A look at some 
evading cases brought under the State statute that have reached the 
higher courts are illustrative. In Utah v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 
(Utah 1997) , the Supreme Court reviewed a case in which a Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper turned on his emergency lights and siren in 
an attempt to stop and detain Mr. Leyva only to have the defendant 
speed up in an attempt to elude the trooper for several miles until 
he finally crashed. The trooper told Mr. Leyva that he was being 
charged with a number of crimes, including evading an officer. In 
the conversation which followed, the officer asked the Defendant: 
"So you admit you saw my lights and were trying to run from me?" 
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The defendant replied: "Yeah, I was. . . ." 951 P. 2d at 740. 
Defendant contends that this is the same kind of conduct prohibited 
by the subject ordinance, and that his conduct did not show an 
intent to run or hide. Even with these facts, Mr. Leyva was 
convicted not of evading, but of failing to respond to an officer's 
signal, in violation of § 41-6-13. That statute prohibits a person 
from wilfully failing to comply with "any lawful order or direction 
of any peace officer". Perhaps this conduct is what Defendant 
committed; but this behavior is an infraction, not the more serious 
Class B misdemeanor with which Defendant stands convicted. Mere 
failure to obey is not the crime charged, The elements include an 
attempt to flee; and this simply was not proved. 
In State v. Finlavson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243 (Utah 2000), 
the Supreme Court turned to Black's Law Dictionary to define 
"flight" as: 
"The evading of the course of justice by voluntarily 
withdrawing one's self in order to avoid arrest or detention 
.... Also comprehends concealment. (Quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 640 (6th ed. 1990)). 
The Court continued by holding that, 
"It is quite clear , however, that at the very minimum, 
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flight includes (1) a leaving and (2) a subsequent hiding out, 
evasion, or concealment." 2000 UT 10 at %10. 
It seems clear that Defendant's behavior does not fit into the 
common usage of the terms in the ordinance, nor does it meet the 
analogous definition of "flight" established by the Utah Supreme 
Court. Defendant's conviction can only survive this Court's review 
if the terms used in the ordinance—specifically "flee," "escape" 
and "evade"--are construed to mean something similar to disobeying 
a police officer's order. Had the Plaintiff prosecuted the 
Defendant under a theory of general disobedience, the fit between 
facts and law would not be as fatally imprecise as in this present 
case. However, that is not this case, in which the conviction rests 
on an incorrect construction of the ordinance. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WHEN IT FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
STATED "THE POLICE WERE TELLING ME OR SOMEONE TO STOP," AND 
THEREBY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT HAD HEARD OR SEEN POLICE OFFICERS' 
ATTEMPTS TO HAVE DEFENDANT STOP. 
The clear weight of the evidence, even when marshaled, does 
not support the factual conclusion that Defendant stated that "the 
police were telling me or someone to stop" thereby allowing for the 
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conclusion that Defendant heard or saw the police telling Defendant 
to stop. This finding is critical because the ordinance requires 
that the Defendant "knowingly" tried to evade or flee from the 
police after "receiving" a signal or command to stop. 
Early in the direct examination of the Defendant, he stated 
that, "At the time I believe the police officer was telling me or 
whoever to stop, the police car was at least 75 feet away from my 
house." (Tr. 14, 15). He continued, "At the approximate time, I 
may have been 15 feet from my door . . . when the officer was telling 
us to-or telling whoever to stop; once again, I'm not hearing-" 
(Tr. 15). 
There are at least two different ways to interpret these 
statements, each conveying a very different idea. The wedge 
between the interpretations raises the question of how the 
Defendant arrived at his belief that the police officer was 
"telling me or whoever to stop." The interpretation that supports 
Defendant's conviction, on which the Trial Court seemed to rely for 
its verdict, is that the Defendant's belief was based on his 
hearing or seeing the police trying to stop him. An equally 
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plausible interpretation is that his belief was based on things he 
had been told after his arrest and before the trial. The weight of 
the evidence supports the latter. 
The Defendant's own testimony is that he did not know the 
police officers were following him toward his house. In response to 
the question, uDo you remember a policeman yelling at you?" 
Defendant responded nNo, sir." (Tr. 15); and to the question, "You 
did not know anyone was behind you?" he, again responded, "No, 
sir." The Defendant testified that until he let the dogs out and 
began walking back toward the front of his house, he didn't know 
the reason for all the noise and yelling he'd heard while dealing 
with his dogs (Tr. 17). 
The West Valley City Attorney, however, ignored all the 
subsequent testimony and jumped to the conclusion that Defendant 
said what he did because he had actually heard the police yelling 
for him to stop. The short cross-examination of the Defendant 
pushed hard for this conclusion: 
Q At the beginning of your testimony, you said that you 
heard officers yell to you or someone to stop; isn't that 
correct? 
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A I heard the officers yelling, yes, sir, and the people 
over at the park yelling, yes, sir. 
Q Okay. But then you testified that [sic] were yelling at 
you or at someone--
A I had no--
Q --you weren't sure, to stop? 
A I have no idea. 
Q Okay. But--
A I didn't hear one say stop or anything. 
Q Let me stop you. At the beginning of your testimony, you 
said that you heard the officers yelling at you or 
someone to stop; isn't that correct? 
A Yes, sir. (Tr. 18) 
This exchange shows that what the Defendant actually said was 
close to what the prosecution attorney tried on cross to get 
Defendant to admit to, but not verbatim. The subtle difference 
between what Defendant actually said and what the prosecuting 
attorney gets him to agree to is the difference between admitting 
to hearing the officer yell stop and admitting only to a belief 
that the officer yelled for him to stop; a belief he could have 
come by in the interim since the event. At every opportunity 
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Defendant was given to explain what happened, Defendant was clear 
that he heard yelling but was not aware it was directed at him. 
On redirect, the Defendant was asked one more time, so as no 
question of interpretation would blur the issue, "Mr. Hoskins, did 
you understand that someone was yelling for you to stop?" to which 
he answered, "No. Not for me to stop, no, sir." (Tr. 18). 
In addition to Defendant's testimony, much of the other 
testimony does not support a finding that the Defendant "stated, 
'the police were telling me or someone to stop'." For example, 
Officer Casias testified that he and his partner made no attempt to 
announce their presence until the Defendant was walking away from 
the park and the patrol car. Only then did the officers think 
"we'd better get out of the car and make contact with him. . ." (Tr. 
11) . A neighbor who witnessed the whole encounter testified that 
after the Officer Casias got out of his car he walked "to the back 
of his car and him and the other officer pulled out their firearms" 
and only then began to approach the Defendant, by which time the 
Defendant "was already at his front door going into his house." 
(Tr. 21). 
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The neighbor also testified that he could not recall hearing 
the police officers say anything directed toward the Defendant (Tr. 
21). This witness's testimony not only supports the conclusion 
that the Defendant did not hear the police yelling stop, but the 
idea that the Defendant was not even in a position to hear. Even 
Officer Casias admitted at trial that he and his partner were "a 
ways away" when they began yelling at the Defendant (Tr. 12). 
The Defendant's girlfriend, who witnessed the event from 
Defendant's front yard, testified that the police officers ''pulled 
up fairly far away and they did not scream to anybody to stop" (Tr. 
25); and that she "didn't hear them scream stop, but I was 
screaming myself" (Tr. 26) ; and that "there was a lot of noise 
going on. When cops pull up with their AK-47s, there's a lot of 
noise going on." (Tr. 28). 
In addition, even assuming Defendant heard the police yelling 
for someone to stop, there is no evidence to support the idea that 
the police officers' commands were with the reasonable specificity 
required by the ordinance. West Valley City Criminal Code 21-6-107 
requires that the prosecution prove that the police officers' 
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visual or audible signal or command to remain or stop be 
"reasonable" and Defendant "knowingly" ignored the command and 
attempted to flee. In the present case, with the cacophony of the 
yelling kids, police officers and Defendant's girlfriend added to 
the fact that Defendant was not doing anything he believed a police 
officer would want him to stop, a "reasonable" audible signal needs 
a degree of specificity beyond a simple command to stop to meet the 
requirements of this ordinance. 
At every opportunity in his testimony, Defendant was given to 
explain what happened, Defendant was clear that he heard yelling 
but did not have reason to think the yelling was directed toward 
him. 
CONCLUSION 
Even when marshaled in favor of the Trial Court's finding, the 
clear weight of the evidence does not support the conclusion that 
Defendant knowingly disregarded a reasonable signal to remain or 
stop and, instead, attempted to escape, flee or evade the police 
officers. In addition, the behavior of the Defendant, when he 
entered his home for the purpose of letting his dogs out into the 
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backyard before returning to the front of his house, does not meet 
the common usage of the terms "evade," "escape" or "flee." 
DATED this | J l day of October, 2001. 
MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. 
U(JLHIM 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
< \ I hereby certify that on the \ J day of October, 2001, I did 
mail two true and correct copies of Appellant's Brief to J. Richard 
Catten, attorney for Appellee, 3600 Constitution Blvd., West Valley 
City, UT 84119. 
Appeal\HoskinsBnef 
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IN THE JUSTICE COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (West Valley City) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROY BENJAMIN HOSKINS 
2689 VESPA DRIVE 
WEST VALLEY CITY UT 84119 
DOB: 08/10/73 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Court No.011101442 
The undersigned Affiant, based on West Valley Polieg'CaseNtamber 01-13389, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant, on or about 03/22/200]/ committed the following crime(s) 
within the city limits: * 
COUNT 1: Fleeing a Peace Officer, West Valley City Municipal Code 21-6-107 (Class B), 
It is a class "B" misdemeanor for any person on foot or on or in a non-motorized vehicle to 
knowingly flee from, evade, escape or attemptio flee from, escape or evade a peace offlcef~after 
being lawfully detained, arrested or stopped; or^ after receiving a reasonable visual (or audibl 
signal or command to remain or stop. 
This Information is based on the evidence obtained from the following witnesses: 
OFFICER CASIAS, 8262 
OFFICER J. PEARCE, 8119 
& 
The evidence from those witne is is summarized in the following probable cause statement: 
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE OFFICER'S COMMAND TO STOP, 
AND PROCEEDED INTO HIS HOME. 
AFFIANT X 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this day of , 20. 
MAGISTRATE 
01-13389, hk, June 07, 2001 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
Salt Lake City, West Valley Department 
3636 S. Constitution Blvd., WVC, UT 84119 
(CITYJ STATE 
-VS-
SENTENCE / JUDGMENT FORM 
Plaintiff. 
RjLU 5 . T=4d*Jg*rtA 
D0B:_S_/J5_ZI2. 
CASE N U M B E R _ ^ l i [ ^ f f ^ _ 
JUDGE 
CLERK. 9K 
Defendant Plaintiff Counsel' O&ttMtM 
_ . _ . TiMTnTTTfTL Defense rnnn^l O'WlQuJwllH 
Interpreter: '-^ 
W^fhingg flt> 
THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
(l)FINEAMT 
FINEAMT 
FINEAMT 
FINEAMT 
FINEAMT 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
FINEAMT $ 
.SUSP $ 
.SUSP $~ 
.SUSP $" 
.SUSP $' 
SUSP $" 
SUSP $" 
JAIL 3D 
.JAIL 
JAIL 
JAJL 
.JAJL 
JAIL 
.SUSPJ5&. 
.SUSP 
.SUSP 
.SUSP 
.SUSP 
SUSP 
(2) RESTITUTION $ 
(3) COURT COST $ 
(4) ATTORNEY FEES $ _ 
TOTAL DUE $ J 3 £ £ U j l 
. Pay to:. .Court. . Victim. .Show Proof to Court 
.mo. Payment Schedule: Pay $ 
(5) Community Service in lieu of Jail / Fine. 
,7fii\Prnharinn/TTTA Mos. IO 
Ajj TERMS OF PROBATION /TT7A 
~" El No Further Violations 
• AA Meetings /wk. 
• Random UA's 
. 1st Pmt Due. 
.Hrs_ 
.Court. IT AP&P. 
.Last Pmt due JZL[]2L 
.Date Due 
.ACEC 
• Counseling thru. 
/month • Classes. 
• In/Out Treatment. 
• Health Testing • No Alcohol/non prescribed Cont Subs 
Proof of_ ft&fffink 
• OTHER. 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 
30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT 
&. H^JW 
Defendant 
1-1 
